The conference stated that "strengthening of village councils is central to the administration of justice in remote Alaska" ( Id: 2).
Professional justice was also to be improved. Trials were to be held in more rural locations, police and judicial travel budgets were to be increased, and education and recruitment of Natives in each justice bureaucracy was to be accomplished.
It suggested that "(T)he cultural context and impact of judi cial administration must be thoroughly understood by all involved in the system of bush justice" (Id:4).
Court arraignments were to be conducted in Native languages and bilingual attorneys or para-professionals were to be recruited (Id:6).
That an act was committed pursuant to Native custom was to be considered as a mitigating factor in sentencing (Id:6).
The University of Alaska was requested to establish an insti tute to train legal personnel in both rural and urban areas in Native culture and languages (Id:3). The University, state administration and judicial council were to initiate programs of research concerning such areas as the character and processes of village law-making, judicial administration and law enforcement"
( Id: 5) .
This last recommendation is particularly important because it led to my invitation to join the University of Alaska.
These reforms of bush justice were in turn to be implanted in an environment hostile to local innovation or dispersal of power to villages.
The constitution established a centralized court system (with no pockets of local autonomy such as county courts); a Department of Public Safety; a Di vision of Corrections within the Depart ment of Heal th and Social Services; a Department of Law; and a state Public Defender Agency. Each of the latter agencies were headed by appointees of the governor. These state agencies had some limited competition from incorporated cities and organized boroughs. But in bush Alaska, it is fair to say that they had free reign over the local level and quality of service.
State agency heads sat on the Governor's Commission for the Administration of Justice headed by Chief Justice Boney. State law and order money was directed to state agencies not local com munities.
Village Alaska had Native representation but no strong advo cate for federal dollars. 2
The era was marked by the conclusion of the Native land claims debate. The settlement resulted in a prolonged process of land selection and distribution of funds among regional cor porations in Alaska. Native legislators did not focus upon bush justice issues in village Alaska. Regionalization was the byword of Native political organization (Conn and Garber, 1981) .
With Boney's untimely death in 1972, the impetus for direc tion of the justice system and content passed back to the discrete departments charged with policing, prosecution, defense and corrections and their professional administration. Continuance of meetings of the Governor's Commission was for little more than a mutual division of the federal spoils.
Villages were to remain legal colonies, subject arbitrarily to either inadequate police assistance or, in other cases, gross overpolicing. Neither village autonomy nor professional service improved.
The relationship between village and state law suf fered.
For the researcher, then, an evaluation of his role in this process must include very serious professional soul searching.
Did his emphasis upon cultural adaptation understate and conceal the political imperatives which dictated the allocation of resources throughout the period? Did "cultural difference" pro vide the excuse for justice decision makers to avoid hard deci- The researchers are in a third camp.
They were called upon to study the relationships between the state and village justice processes. They also zeroed in on the relationships of Natives to one or both systems each from legal perspectives, historical perspectives, anthropological perspectives, but rarely from political perspectives. Over ten years they researched, tested and recommended solutions to policymaking professionals.
In short, the work of researchers tended to concentrate around the delivery of services to villages and the interplay of village and state legal process.
As with the paraprofessionals, researchers reported to both systems but had a power base in neither. 6 Outside of the justice bureacracies they operated somewhat out of control of all key participants but had access to any and all.
The Early Years of The Relationship
In Alaska village councils, locally elected bodies, have now had 6 0 years of experience in the business of dispute adjustment (See Conn and Hippler, 1973a) or 35 more than the state legal system. Teacher-missionaries introduced these institutions.
Their intent appears to have been to use the councils to advance their own agenda: to suppress the manufacture of hootch, to seek out and punish sinners and to urge upon parents the discipline necessary to operate village schools in communities still geared to the rhythms of hunting and fishing.
Councils over time cut loose from teachers and found a place within the larg er web of white and Eskimo social control. (Milan, 1964 and Case, 1978) .
Councils were the last stop in a process of evolving inter personal customary law ways and the first step in a process of Western intervention that could result in referral to a police and court process outside of the village.
Western legal intervention had made impossible (or at least more dangerous) killing or banishment as final steps in a customary legal process. However, to a certain extent it had replaced these ultimate steps with removal into its own legal process in a distant place at the request of village councils.
Councils were most often an Eskimo institution of last resort but even within its processes of case adjustment were opportuni ties to admit one's guilt, ask forgiveness and be reintegrated into the community. Orientation and not punishment was the usual result of the process. Two or three appearances before a council could be anticipated before it soug ht to draw in outside police authority. Villages were informed that they were to handle matters on their own and notify the police only when violent felonies had occurred. Letters to police during the period demonstrate that detailed descriptions of repeated violence were often left unanswered.
A survey conducted by researchers and troopers in 55 villages in 1977 revealed that on the average it took three days for the troopers to respond to a request for assistance (Angell, 1981a) . Youthful populations rose dramatically, partially as a result of improved health care, and populations shifted from villages more distant from towns to those within relatively close proximity to towns.
Impac t on Counc il Justic e in the 1970's
Councils as institutions have continued to play a central role in dispute processing in more than a 100 villages without
magistrates. Yet to continue that activity councils were forced to become less "council-like," by earlier definitions, and more court-like by magistrate terms.
Councils confronted a more persistent stream of conflicts of a magnitude and severity unlike the immediate past.
With external punitive intervention less reliable, many coun cils shifted from bodies of reconciliation to bodies which directed fines and other sanctions at offenders. This shift from council-like to court-like approach was never completely success ful. When magistrates and village police were offered to villages through appointment and training, the issue was not best articu lated as a conflict between law systems, Western and non-Western. Yet un der this n ew arran gemen t what appeared to be more de facto control of village affairs was less.
Village Efforts
The record shows persistent attempts by villagers to con struct their own system as a component of the state process.
Villagers were told to turn back to "the old ways" and draw upon a village consensus for enforcement of village law. But the "old ways" were formed out of a coalition of white and Native authority. The "old way" did not contend with prepaid liquor orders by telephone, improved air and land transport and wage opportunities of a younger generation as demanding of their offi cial legal rights as other Alaskans.
Villages requested assistance in the drafting of their own town statutes. They realized that some skilled professional advice was necessary in order to make the laws enforceable within the state system.
When ordinances were sent to Juneau to an agency cons ti tu tionally obligated to help towns and villages, they were filed away without comment. 8 Villages were left in a legal never never land as troopers and state officials refused to apply village ordinances.
Even village magistrates scorned village ordinances.
What village justice systems have had to undertake has outstripped their capacity to deal with it pre-emptively. Problems have also overrun their capacity to deal with them in Western terms through policing, judging and jailing (See Angell, 1981a) .
Professional Perspectives
The reality of a relationship between white legal agents representative of first military, then territorial, then state authority to small villages has changed little, if at all, in more than a hundred years of contact (Conn, 1981b; Jennes, 1962; and Murton, 1965) . What has changed are professional attitudes toward the relationship.
Professional policymakers fail to understand village justice as a component of their own justice system. They view village process as a separate reality from which they with lesser or greater capacity remove cases to be dealt with in the thorough going process that they know to be the "real" justice system, real justice being a process of adversary justice leading to state corrections.
Professional operatives in towns understand the relevance of matters left to village justice. But, for them, these matters are simply problems happily left outside of the realm of their own professional caseload. "Progressive villages" or "villages which handle their own problems" are admired by town-based pro fessionals out of relief more than out of respect (Nix and Timbers interviews, 1973 ). On what terms then could reforms of bush justice be made?
Perspectives and interpretations of "improvement" vary as one isolates interested constituencies. Institutional perspectives and ideological perspectives guide professional judgment.
The administrator of the court system is said to have referred to bush Alaska as a "can of worms." Implantation of a centralized judicial system in farflung town and village Alaska was problematic. Costs were high. Discovery of persons to fill positions was difficult.
After the state constitution went into effect, the only offi cial judicial activity tolerated was through court personnel.
Towns and villages without judges or magistrates could not offi cially appoint a judge or employ a council as court (Alaska State , 1959) .
From an administrator's perspective allocation of judicial resources presented several problems:
(1) dangers of autonomy borne from distance, lack of super vision and lack of indoctrination into Western legal perspective;
(2) dangers of community influence on decisions made appropriate to resolution in terms of higher law; and The professional bureaucratic perspective emphasized super vision and control from higher levels to lower levels. It was difficult if not impossible to establish a system of justice in smaller Native communities satisfactory to this objective.
The village perspective seemed to be a desire for control sufficient to deal with matters early and efficiently and to employ the professional justice system for support when necessary.
It implied an autonomy which the centralized system rejected.
Magistrates as Guardians of Due Process
The court looks to its rural magistrates and Native court personnel for interpretation of Western meaning and values underlying instructions in Native languages in criminal and civil cases in rural Alaska.
Yet the Native magistrate's actual capacity to try cases, to advise clients and to reject overtures by police who might attempt to influence the justice process has been a matter of ongoing bureaucratic concern by the state court system in the past 10 years. Two advisory committees of lawyers headed by the chief justice mulled over the problems of that component (Second Magistrate Advisory Committee, 1979) . Of primary concern was the challenge of authorizing persons with lay education to adjudicate cases in villages ill-equipped to sustain a judicial officer.
Magistrates often lacked proper "facilities" (courtrooms and jails) and support from police regularly hired. We researchers pointed out that magistrates displaced but did not actually replace village justice systems in Eskimo villages.
We and Native organizations advocated and tested variant forms of dispute adjustment more reflective of small villages' needs and capacities ranging from mediation panels which might operate alongside a fining or adjudicative authority to councils or boards vested with the limited judicial authority which the magistrate possessed (See Case, 1977).
As will be seen, the court system toyed with the concept of alternative forms of dispute adjustment, following the first bush justice conference, but then rejected it explicitly as a court function (Second Magistrates Advisory Committee, 1979:19).
The Researchers' Perspective
As researchers, we viewed ourselves as legal culture bro kers, prepared to make comprehensible, practical adjustments to both the village and state sides of the justice system.
Our primary target was not a law process as measured by either ideological Western considerations or perceived Native law
ways, but what we viewed to be an amalgam of both systems with adjustments necessary on both sides.
Our focus was on the bottom of the system. Our goal was to improve the daily operation of law as reflected in perceived village needs by developing methods for enhanced interaction between state and village processes as we had come to understand them. These methods were to be sustainable and acceptable to village consumers and justice policymakers and field operatives.
We satisfied consumers and field operatives but not policymakers.
The Problem Board Experiment
The problem board experiment was grounded in careful study of the village council process both historical and contemporary throughout the 75 villages which comprise Eskimo Alaska. In association with the Eskimo village of Emmonak we worked on the process. It was in fact a process of rediscovery since Emmonak had only recently delegated its dispute adjustment to village police and a magistrate. The state had provided these Western law figures with a portable "holding facility" (jail).
The council had been able to drop its role as fining and jailing council. It had done this with some relief.
Villagers recognized that an element of the earlier process was missing. The magistrate spoke of the family counseling she was called upon to undertake. She desired something like the old council to take up this activity. Problems with juveniles and other problems not clearly legal were mentioned. The village developed the concept on its own. We had antici pated that matters would flow naturally from police to the magistrate and then be diverted by her to the problem board. In fact, what occurred was that matters moved directly and indepen dently to the board (Conn and Hippler, 1975) .
The problem board during its test phase dealt with matters which did not have clear legal remedies. These often involved situations involving alcohol which, if left uncounseled, were expected to result in violence.
For example, the board counseled A who gave liquor to B, causing family chaos. It counseled C who teased D for using welfare money to play bingo. When E, a teacher aide, kicked F, a student, it drew E and G (his parent) together to work out a compromise. It dealt with difficult family problems involving drinking, wife beating and child abuse. Juvenile matters were often considered.
In the main, it anticipated violence. It had no power to fine or jail but could refer (and be referred) cases to and from the magistrate and the police.
The Court Experiment with Problem Boards
When the model became an experimental "program" within the court system, the court personnel in charge selected test vil lages with little concern for institutional relationships with councils or magistrates.
While the problem board provided a mechanism for Native language speakers of all educational backgrounds to participate, only some villages were given to understand that one's skills at negotiation and conciliation and not youth and education were primary criteria. Others selected callow untrained youth for their boards.
Court personnel did not feel comfortable with village experience at dispute adjustment. They held a workshop for problem board members at an urban resort and had members of the American Arbitration Association employ models of conciliation drawn from labor, prison and other urban settings to teach the Eskimos how to resolve disputes.
Some test villages on their own grafted the board into their
processes with varying degrees of success.
In village X near
Bethel the board found a niche between the police and now-fining and jailing council (Conn, 1975b) . Others saw the problem board as a weak substitute for either a magistrate or council.
The court hired an attorney and anthropologist to evaluate the boards. Although the report was favorable to those boards which had been active, it stressed the limited number of matters heard (Marguez and Serdahely, 1977) and not problems avoided by board activity.
The court's response was to end its association with the experiment. From its perspective, the boards had failed because they had not replaced either magistrates or extra-legal councils which fined or jailed when magistrates or outside assistance was not available.
Although the court disassociated itself from the project, a 55 village survey two years later discovered three of the six problem boards established were still in operation (Angell, 1979b (Conn and Hippler, 1973b; Conn, 1974) .
The town paralegal' s work was to combine town and village justice. By moving out from the town to villages where crimes had occurred, the rural paralegal would investigate and report back to the professional those social facts ( as well as legal facts) overlooked by police. The police report had almost exclu sive bearing on legal decisions, such as bail, screening, charges, case organization and disposition.
No longer would the professional have to depend on a police report or on conventional wisdom among field professionals to evaluate his case with an eye toward its impact on the real community affected.
Our belief in village paralegals stemmed from several con siderations. First, we had recognized and reported on the depen dence of the rural justice process upon paralegals in a variety of village roles (Conn and Hippler, 1973b) . Second, we were con vinced that the state legal process would not be introduced in village Alaska with any balanced concern for the integrity of either the Western process or understanding of the village law process, its strengths and its weaknesses. We perceived that, at best, state justice agencies would make village connections with a magistrate and a policeman. The screening function so essen tial to the integrity of both systems, carried on previously by the council, or left to a village policeman would be ignored or left to chance (Conn, 1975a) . Professionalization would increase the tendency to intervene in village matters without concern for the propriety of that intervention on the single dispute or on the village law process.
Projects Accomplish ed and Th eir Bureaucratic Response
In the years that followed we were able to test the proposi tion of the town based paralegal who worked for either a district attorney or public defender. A training-tutorial mechanism was established in both Nome and Bethel.
Bush professionals, especially prosecutors, remarked that their professional collaboration with villages were enhanced.
Trainees became serious members of the rural process.
Yet in th is instance as in many oth ers wh ere plans proposed or actually implemented at th e town and village level received Since police are more mobile than other components of the system, and more receptive to bush service, this means construc tion of law systems that could make of villages "closed institutions" with guards and cells (Goffman, 1961) .
We as researchers, fascinated both with cultural pluralism and committed to research leading to reform, must search our souls and consider whether or not the fruit of our labor has resulted in a legal process acceptable to any standard of justice or to none at all. Those of us who are lawyers first and anthro pologists second must consider whether we should steer away from research and lend our skills to law reform and political pressure and not to adaptation of the legal process and roles to fit small village situations.
Were researchers deceived or did they allow themselves to be deceived? Were they blind to overriding political considerations that made of "cultural relevance" a convenient excuse for bureaucracies to employ unless or until they were prepared to establish a partial copy of their system in village Alaska, a system unacceptable by either state or village standards?
We who are infatuated with the opportunities for redefining a state law process to benefit an environment marked by cultural pluralism may find our work manipulated by those who underwrite it and apparently embrace it. From our global perspective should The force of legal assimilation is the dominant force and adaptations in the name of cultural imperatives are mere pauses (or worse than this, excuses) which conceal a longer term trend.
As researchers, we in Alaska have tinkered with the system.
We have listened and attempted to innovate within the system.
What we did not accomplish was to draw Natives into the process as players, capable of negotiating change, possssing power and ultimately manipulating the system as co-or near-equals to other players.
Manipulation and partial control of the system does not mean participation in bush conferences, seats on advisory committees or even membership in lower ranks of justice or police bureaucracies. It means negotiating on legal process from positions of power. To this was footnoted the following:
"The Anglo-American system of justice differs substantially from the traditional Indian, Eskimo and Aleut systems, which pre-dated Western cultures by hundreds of years.
The cultural difficulties experi enced by many of the Alaska Natives as the contemporary Anglo-American ins ti tut ions reach out to the bush com munities require that the State legal system use extreme care in cases of this nature. Therefore, in those areas where a substantial portion of the populations consi ts of Native Alaskans, we urge the administrative office of the court system to develop bilingual explanations of basic rights for those who appear in criminal pro ceedings so that all citizens are clearly aware of their constitutional rights." Gregory at p. 380.
5
Of course differing discoveries by researchers or journalists or complaints lodged in higher courts had differing impacts on state bureaucracies.
For example, the Department of Public Safety actively sup ported research which discovered that violent crimes had overrun limi tea village and state resources.
Its desire was to shift resources from urban areas (where they competed with urban pol ice) to rural sectors. 
